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LEGAL MALPRACTICE-Liability for Failure to Warn: First National Bank of Clovis v. Diane, Inc.

I. INTRODUCTION

In FirstNational Bank of Clovis v. Diane, Inc.,' the New Mexico Court

of Appeals affirmed a lower court decision holding an attorney liable in
tort for his failure to warn a client of potential liability in the event the
attorney's advice proved to be erroneous.' First National Bank of Clovis

represents a growing trend in legal malpractice law that may expand the
preexisting tort liability of New Mexican lawyers for their conduct in
their relationships with clients. This Note examines the rationale of the
court of appeals' opinion and explores the implications of the decision
for practicing attorneys and the developing law of legal malpractice in
New Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1979, Diane, Inc., with the assistance of Nick Kapnison, borrowed
$165,000 from the First National Bank of Clovis. 3 Before billing Diane
for securing the loan, Kapnison asked his attorney, Bernard Robinson,
whether charging a $25,000 brokerage fee would be legal under New
Mexico law. 4 Robinson advised Kapnison that such a fee would be legal.5
Based on that advice, Kapnison billed and collected $25,000.6

Subsequently, First National sued Diane on the promissory notes which
evidenced the loan. 7 Diane then filed a third-party complaint against
Kapnison claiming that Kapnison violated New Mexico law by charging
a brokerage fee in excess of the statutorily authorized amount. 8 The trial
1. 102 N.M. 548, 698 P.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1985).
2. Id. at 553, 698 P.2d at 10.
3. Id. at 551, 698 P.2d at 8. Kapnison's assistance included negotiating and securing the loan
for Diane, Inc. Id. at 550, 698 P.2d at 7.
4. Id. at 551, 698 P.2d at 8.
5. Id.
6. Id.at 550, 698 P.2d at 7.
7. Id.Diane was in default on its payments to First National. The case was settled before it
reached trial.
8. Id. Diane claimed that Kapnison violated N.M. STAT. ANN. §56-8-7 (1978). Id. When Robinson
gave his advice in 1979, that statute provided:
For negotiating or securing any loan, no person, association of persons or corporation
shall charge, collect or receive in excess of the following amounts: upon any loan
not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), four percent; upon any loan exceeding
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court granted summary judgment in the third party action in favor of
Diane and ordered Kapnison to pay Diane the statutory damages of double
the illegal fee. 9 At this point, Kapnison filed an appeal to the supreme
court"° from the summary judgment in favor of Diane and also took the
added precaution of filing a cross-claim against Robinson for legal malpractice, seeking recovery of the amounts he had been ordered to pay to
Diane."
In the appeal, Kapnison claimed that his attorney Robinson had correctly concluded that the brokerage fee limitation statute and the statutory
penalty for violation did not apply because the contracting party was a
corporation. 2 The supreme court affirmed the summary judgment against
Kapnison, rejecting this interpretation of the statutes that had formed the
five hundred dollars ($500) and not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), four
percent upon the first five hundred dollars ($500) and three percent upon the remainder; upon any loan exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), four percent upon
the first one thousand dollars ($1,000), and two percent upon the remainder.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §56-8-7 (1978).
Using the formula set forth in §56-8-7, Kapnison's allowable fee for securing the $165,000 loan
would have been $3,320 (four percent upon the first one thousand dollars and two percent upon the
remaining $164,000).
The legislature has since amended §56-8-7 to provide that broker's fees shall be negotiable, but
shall not exceed six percent of the principal, where the loan is for business, commercial, or agricultural
purposes and exceeds $50,000, or where a registrant under the Mortgage Loan Company and Loan
Broker Act secures the loan. N.M. STAT. ANN. §56-8-7 (Cum. Supp. 1984). Kapnison's allowable
fee under the revised statute would be $9,900 (six percent of $165,000).
9. First National Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 550, 698 P.2d at 7. Kapnison was, therefore,
liable to Diane for damages in the amount of $50,000 (double the $25,000 fee charged). The trial
court calculated the damage award by using N.M. STAT. ANN. §56-8-8 (1978) which provides:
That any person, association of persons or corporation violating the preceding section
[56-8-7 NMSA 1978] shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars [($100)]
nor more than five hundred dollars [($500)], or by imprisonment for not less than
thirty nor more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment; and shall
also be liable in damages to the party injured in double the whole amount so charged
for negotiating or securing any such loan.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-8 (1978). This statute has not been amended. N.M. STAT. ANN. §56-8-8
(Cum. Supp. 1984).
10. Diane v. Kapnison, 100 N.M. 143, 667 P.2d 450 (1983). Because the case involved a contract,
the appeal went directly from the district court to the supreme court. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 345-8 (Cum. Supp. 1985) and 34-5-14 (1978) for court of appeals and supreme court appellate
jurisdiction.
11. First National Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 550, 698 P.2d at 7. In the cross-claim action
against Robinson, Kapnison alleged the negligent inadequacy of Robinson's advice, while at the
same time, he alleged the propriety of that advice in his appeal from the summary judgment in favor
of Diane.
12. Diane, 100 N.M. at 145, 667 P.2d at 452.
When Robinson advised Kapnison in 1979 as to the fee Kapnison could charge, the statute read,
in pertinent part:
B. No provision of law prescribing maximum rates of interest that may be charged
in any transaction shall apply to a transaction in which a corporation is a debtor,
regardless of the purpose for which the corporation was formed and regardless
of the fact that an individual is codebtor, endorser, guarantor, surety or accommodation party. No corporation or its codebtor, endorser, guarantor, surety or
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basis of Robinson's advice to Kapnison. 3 The supreme court held that
corporations could rely on a violation of the statute governing rates of
commissions for procuring loans to support the statutory award of double
the illegal fee.14
After the supreme court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of
Diane, the trial court in the legal malpractice action found Robinson
negligent in failing to advise Kapnison of the potential liability in the
event his advice was incorrect. 5 The trial court awarded Kapnison $51,125
in damages, 6 including attorney fees.' 7 Robinson's appeal from the lower
accommodation party shall have a cause of action or affirmatively plead, counterclaim, setoff or set up the defense of usury in any action to recover damages
or enforce a remedy on any obligation executed by the corporation and no civil
or criminal penalty which would otherwise be applicable shall apply on any
obligation executed by the corporation.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-9 (1978). This statute has since been amended to provide exceptions to
the provision that no civil or criminal penalty shall apply on any obligation executed by the corporation
as set out in N.M. STAT. ANN. §§30-43-1 to -5 (1978). N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-8-9 (Cum. Supp.
1984).
Robinson had relied on § 56-8-9(B), which denied a corporation protection of the usury laws,
when he advised Kapnison that he could legally charge the $25,000 fee to a corporation. First
National Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 551, 698 P.2d at 8. Under Robinson's theory, because §§ 568-7 through -9 followed in the same numerical sequence within the same Article, § 56-8-9 impliedly
repealed §§ 56-8-7 and -8 as to corporations. Diane, 100 N.M. at 145, 667 P.2d at 452. Robinson
argued, therefore, that because Diane was a corporation, § 56-8-9 deprived it of the protection of
the brokerage fee limitations as well as recovery of double damages. Id. Robinson further reasoned
that a fee for securing the loan was interest because the statutes prescribing the legal fees for securing
loans were within the same Article as the statute regulating interest. Id. Corporations were therefore
barred from availing themselves of the protection of the statutes regulating fees for securing loans
because they could not plead usury either affirmatively or defensively. Id.
13. Diane, 100 N.M. at 144-45, 667 P.2d at 451-52. The supreme court stated that courts do
not favor repeals by implication. Id. at 145, 667 P.2d at 452. The court found that the statutes were
clear and dealt with separate and distinct subjects and held that they should be given effect as written.
Id. The court concluded that § 56-8-7 sets forth the charges allowed for negotiating or securing a
loan; § 56-8-9 deals with the interest, discount, or other advantage permitted for the loan of money.
Id. To establish "usury," there must be either "a loan and a taking of usurious interest, or the taking
of more than legal interest for the forbearance of a debt or sum of money due." Id. (quoting Hogg
v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (I Black) 115, 118 (1861)). Kapnison made no loan to Diane, nor was Kapnison
acting as First National's agent. Id. The interest First National charged to Diane and the $25,000
brokerage fee Kapnison charged to Diane are two separate and identifiable charges. Id. Based on
this analysis, the supreme court rejected Kapnison's interpretation of the statutes. Id.
14. Id. at 145-46, 667 P.2d at 452-53.
15. First National Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 550, 698.P.2d at 7.
16. Id. The award included $25,000 for the penalty Kapnison paid to Diane, $25,000 for attorney
fees, and $1,125 tax on the fees. Id. Although Kapnison owed Diane $50,000, because Kapnison
had already received the $25,000 commission, Kapnison's actual out-of-pocket expenses were $25,000
plus attorney fees. Id. at 550 n. 1, 698 P.2d at 7 n. 1.
17. Id. at 550, 698 P.2d at 7. The trial court's award of $25,000 for attorney fees included legal
services for all pre-trial matters, Kapnison's appeal to the supreme court of the summary judgment
in favor of Diane, and trial preparation and trial of the malpractice claim. Id. at 554-55, 698 P.2d
at 11-12.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that Kapnison was entitled
to recover attorney fees for legal 'services rendered in all matters relating to the separate action of
Diane. Id. at 555-56, 698 P.2d at 12-13. In affirming this decision, the court of appeals held that
where an attorney's client is required to engage counsel to defend a separate action proximately
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court's malpractice judgment followed. ' In FirstNationalBank of Clovis
v. Diane, Inc., the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the malpractice
judgment, holding that in light of the particular circumstances of the case,
Robinson should have warned his client of potential liability under a New
Mexico statute in the event Robinson's advice was deemed to be incorrect. 19
III. RATIONALE OF THE COURT

In an action against an attorney for malpractice, a client must prove
that an attorney-client relationship existed, that the attorney's actions
constituted negligence, that the negligence was the proximate cause of
the client's injury, and that the client sustained damages.2" Where the
malpractice claim is based on inadequacy of advice, as in FirstNational
Bank of Clovis, a client must also prove reliance on the attorney's advice
to his or her detriment.2 ' Only the element of whether Robinson's actions
constituted negligence was at issue in FirstNational Bank of Clovis."
resulting from the attorney's negligence, a court may award reasonable attorney fees incurred as
special damages. Id. at 555, 698 P.2d at 12.
Generally, absent a statute or agreement specifically authorizing payment of attorney fees, parties
are held responsible for paying their own fees. Id. The court of appeals applied this rule to the
malpractice action and decided that Kapnison was responsible for paying attorney fees incurred in
his action against Robinson. Id. The case was remanded, therefore, to exclude attorney fees incurred
in the malpractice action. Id.
The court of appeals provided three reasons for holding that Robinson was liable for Kapnison's
attorney fees in all legal matters prior to the malpractice action. First, New Mexico appellate courts
have permitted the recovery of attorney fees in two cases with circumstances similar to the present
action. Id. In the first case, the supreme court held attorney fees recoverable as part of accommodation
indemnitor's expense of defending himself on a performance bond. Id. (citing Dinkle v. Denton,
68 N.M. 108, 359 P.2d 345 (1961)). In the second case, the court of appeals recognized the right
of an insured to recover from his insurer attorney fees he had incurred while defending a wrongful
death action. Id. (citing Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 229, 501 P.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1972)). Second,
other jurisdictions have held that attorney fees are recoverable under these circumstances. Id. See
Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 90 I11.App.3d 368, 413 N.E.2d 47 (1980); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., 263 La. 774, 269 So.2d 239 (1972); Coats v. Bussard, 94 Mich. App. 558, 288
N.W.2d 651, rev'd on other grounds, 409 Mich. 858, 294 N.W.2d 692 (1980); Hiss v. Friedbert,
201 Va. 572, 112 S.E.2d 871 (1960); Gustavson v. O'Brien, 87 Wis.2d 193, 274 N.W.2d 627
(1979). Third, and most important, the court reasoned that if resolving a problem caused by an
attorney's negligence necessitated the hiring of an accountant, a plaintiff would recover the accountant's fees as an ordinary element of damages. Where the only difference is that it was necessary
for the plaintiff to hire an attorney rather than an accountant to resolve the conflict, it is illogical
for a court to deny recovery of attorney fees. First National Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 555, 698
P.2d at 12.
18. First National Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 548, 698 P.2d at 5.
19. Id. at 550, 698 P.2d at 7.
20. See George v. Caton, 93 N.M. 370, 373, 600 P.2d 822, 825 (Ct. App. 1979).
21. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 217, at 311 (1977).
22. FirstNationalBank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 550, 698 P.2d at 7. The court confined its analysis
to whether Robinson's actions constituted negligence because it was the only element of malpractice
Robinson presented as an issue in the case. Brief for Appellant at 1, First National Bank of Clovis
v. Diane, Inc., 102 N.M. 548, 698 P.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1985).
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In determining whether Robinson had a duty to advise his client of
potential liability, the New Mexico Court of Appeals examined the particular circumstances of the case and compared Robinson's conduct to
that of lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity.23 The crucial inquiry was
whether Robinson's advice to Kapnison was so legally deficient that his
conduct did not reach the level of skill, prudence, and diligence exercised
by the ordinary lawyer.24 By applying this objective standard test of
requisite competence under the circumstances, the court disregarded Robinson's argument that his good faith belief in the correctness of his advice
should shield him from liability.25
Once the court *ascertained the test, it looked to whether Robinson's
actions met the requisite degree of competence. The court of appeals
found that the statutes were clear as written26 and noted that well-established principles of statutory construction would have caused a careful
practitioner to pause before concluding that corporations could not rely
23. First National Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 552, 698 P.2d at 9. By applying this test, the
court held Robinson to the professional standard of care-that attorneys are to use a reasonable
degree of care and skill and to possess the knowledge necessary to perform their duties properly.
Comment, ProfessionalNegligence, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 627, 635 (1973). Reasonable care, skill,
and knowledge is determined by the degree of care, diligence, and skill a practicing attorney of
ordinary skill, prudence, and knowledge of the law would exercise in a situation of like character
under like circumstances. Id.
The professional standard applies the objective test of what a reasonable attorney would do to the
subjective set of particular facts of the attorney's situation. Ishmael v. Millington, 50 Cal. Rptr.
592, 595, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 523 (1966). See also Sarti v. Udal, 91 Ariz. 24, 25, 369 P.2d 92,
93 (1962) (where the court stated that what may be negligence on the part of an attorney in any
particular case must be decided by the facts and circumstances of the situation under consideration).
See generally Rodriguez v. Horton, 95 N.M. 361, 364-65, 622 P.2d 261, 264-65 (Ct. App. 1980)
(where a testifying attorney analyzed the particular acts and circumstances of the defendant attorney
to determine whether they were beneath the standard of care applicable to a reasonably prudent
Workmen's Compensation lawyer). The FirstNational Bank of Clovis court addressed the inadequacy
of an attorney's advice, which has become a recurring basis of liability under the professional
standard. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 217 (1977). Although an attorney need not
caution of every possible alternative, if the attorney should have reason to believe that adverse
consequences of his advice might exist, he must so advise his client. Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., 366 F.Supp. 1283, 1290 (M.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1974).
Other recurring bases of liability include errors of judgment, the failure to follow instructions, the
failure to meet time limitations, delegation or referral, financial management of a client's property,
misappropriation or loss of funds, and legal malpractice as a defense to compensation. R. MALLEN
& V. LEvrT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE at 299 (1977).
24. FirstNational Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 552, 698 P.2d at 9. The court evaluated Robinson's
legal advice regarding the statute against the state of the law at the time he interpreted it in 1979
and not after the court in Diane, Inc. v. Kapnison settled the law. Id. The quality of an attorney's
services is to be evaluated on the basis of the law as it appeared at the time the services in question
were rendered, and not at the time of the legal malpractice action. Smith v. Lewis, 118 Cal. Rptr.
621, 625, 530 P.2d 589, 593 (1975).
25. FirstNational Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 553, 698 P.2d at 10.
26. Id. The court stated that in 1979 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-7 (1978) clearly concerned brokerage
fees while N.M. STAT. ANN. §56-8-9 (1978) clearly dealt with usury. Id. at 552, 698 P.2d at 9.
For text of statutes, see supra note 8 and note 12.
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on a violation of the statute.27 The trial court record discloged Robinson's
awareness of those well-established principles. 28 The record also indicated
Robinson's familiarity with the brokerage statutes in 1979;29 he was aware
that the brokerage fee limitation statute applied to brokers and that the
statutes made a distinction between interest and a brokerage fee.3 Robinson testified at trial that he had considered the two cases interpreting
the statutes before rendering his advice.31 Because in one of the cases
considered the court upheld an award of double damages for a violation
of the brokerage fee limitation statute,32 the court of appeals reasoned
that Robinson should have known that substantial penalties could be
imposed if Kapnison charged an excessive fee. 33
Given these facts and circumstances, the court of appeals reasoned that
when Robinson rendered his advice, he had reasonable grounds to consider his interpretation questionable and, therefore, should have advised
Kapnison of potential liability."4 Applying the objective standard to Robinson's conduct, the court concluded that an attorney possessing and
exercising ordinary skill and capacity would have found it prudent to
advise the client of the potential exposure to liability under the New
Mexico statute.

The court then added "a further compelling reason" for holding Rob27. FirstNational Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 552, 698 P.2d at 9. The court of appeals stated
that in Diane v. Kapnison, the supreme court analyzed and found lacking in merit the theory that
corporations could not rely on a violation of N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-7 (1978); therefore, the court
of appeals refrained from repeating that analysis. Id. For a discussion of the supreme court's analysis
in Diane, see supra note 13.
28. First National Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 552, 698 P.2d at 9. The record disclosed that
Robinson was aware that New Mexico statutes are to be given effect as written, and where free
from ambiguity, no room for construction exists. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The court also considered that the record disclosed that Robinson had previously advised
an individual that his listed "finder's fee" was more than the statutory amount allowed under § 568-7. Id.
31. Id. The first case made clear that § 56-8-7 applies only to a broker-principal relationship.
Home Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Bates, 76 N.M. 660, 662, 417 P.2d 798, 800 (1966). In the second
case, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld an award of double damages found as a result of a
violation of the statute which limits loan brokerage fees. Forrest Currell Lumber Co. v. Thomas,
81 N.M. 161, 165, 464 P.2d 891, 895 (1970).
32. Forrest Currell, 81 N.M. at 165, 464 P.2d at 895.
33. FirstNational Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 552, 698 P.2d at 9.
34. Id. at 552-53, 698 P.2d at 9-10. The court of appeals quoted what the court in Smith v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. had expressed:
[I]f the attorney has reason to believe, or should have reason to believe that there
could be some adverse consequences from taking the course advised, he is obligated to so advise his client. But if there is no reasonable ground for him to
believe that his advice is questionable, he certainly has no obligation to advise
clients of every remote possibility that might exist.
Id. at 553, 698 P.2d at 10 (quoting Smith, 366 F.Supp. at 1290).
35. Id.
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inson liable for malpractice. 36 Balancing Kapnison's potential liability for
following Robinson's advice against his financial benefit from doing so,
the court determined that the potential liability clearly outweighed any
benefit to Kapnison.37 The court concluded that Robinson should have
recognized this potential burden to his client and, therefore, should have
chosen a more conservative approach."
The court of appeals emphasized that Robinson was not liable for
malpractice because he incorrectly interpreted the statutes at a time when
the law was unsettled.39 Rather, Robinson was liable because, in light of
the particular circumstances of the case, Robinson should have taken a
more conservative approach and warned Kapnison of the liability he might
encounter by charging a $25,000 brokerage fee.' °
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In reaching its conclusion, the FirstNational Bank of Clovis court left
three areas of ambiguity that could have been addressed. First, in determining that the good faith standard was inapplicable in this case, the
court missed an opportunity to address the standard's general inapplicability to legal malpractice actions. Second, the court left open three
possible interpretations of the significance of balancing potential liability
with benefit in duty to warn actions. Finally, by confining its analysis
and discussion to the particular facts-of the case, the court chose not to
discuss the significance of FirstNational Bank of Clovis in the developing
law of legal malpractice.
A. The Court's Disregardof the Good Faith Standard
The court of appeals disregarded Robinson's argument that his good
faith and honest belief that his advice was correct should shield him from
liability.4 ' However, the only guidance the court provided for why a good
faith belief was insufficient was that under the particular circumstances
36. Id.
37. Id. Using Robinson's advice, Kapnison's potential liability under § 56-8-8 was $50,000 in
damages payable to Diane and a possible fine, imprisonment, or both if convicted of a misdemeanor.
See supra note 9 for full text of statute. Kapnison's potential financial benefit using Robinson's
advice was $21,680 ($25,000 he charged minus the $3,320 he could have charged under § 56-8-7).
38. FirstNational Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 553, 698 P.2d at 10. The court recognized that
because an attorney's judgment may result in litigation is not, by itself, a breach of duty to the
client. Litigation often results from a disagreement of professional judgment. Id.
39. Id. Robinson had argued that because the law was unsettled when he gave his advice in 1979,
he could not be held liable for an error in judgment. Id. at 551, 698 P.2d at 8.
40. Id. at 553, 698 P.2d at 10.
41. The court concluded that "[t]he soundness of defendant's advice should be evaluated on more
than a good faith belief; rather, whether he exhibited the requisite degree of competence." Id. at
553, 698 P.2d at 10.
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of the case, the objective standard was applicable.42 Because the court
did not clearly express its reason for rejecting the good faith argument,
the court implicitly suggested that the good faith defense to liability may
retain viability in certain unarticulated situations. By so doing, the court
missed an opportunity to state clearly that a good faith defense is generally
inapplicable in legal malpractice negligence actions.
Cases involving an attorney's error of judgment or mistake of law can
be explained on the basis that an attorney is not negligent if a reasonably
competent attorney could have made the error under the circumstances;
otherwise, the attorney is liable.43 No New Mexico court has relieved an
attorney from liability simply because the attorney honestly believed that
his or her actions were correct. The First National Bank of Clovis court
quoted the good faith standard it had articulated in a previous case' but
explained that this standard was prefaced with the recognition that even
with respect to matters involving judgment, an attorney must exercise
reasonable and ordinary care and diligence. 5
The good faith standard contained in cases from other jurisdictions
appears either as dicta or as an articulation of the breach of fiduciary
duties rather than the duty of care associated with malpractice claims.46
In fact, the good faith standard is nothing more than a vestige from an
earlier era that serves no function in determining negligence. 4" The only
42. Id.
43. Beckham, Trial Lawyer's Liability for Judgmental Decisions, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF
TRIAL LAWYERS:'THE MALPRACTICE QUESTION 157, 160 (1979).
44. First National Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 552, 698 P.2d at 9. The court quoted what it had
stated in George v. Caton, 93 N.M. 370, 376, 600 P.2d 822, 828 (Ct. App. 1979), "[a] lawyer is
not liable, however, for an error in judgment if he acts in good faith and in an honest belief that
his advice and acts are well founded and in the best interest of his clients." Id.
In George, the plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for losses sustained when defendant
attorneys failed to file a wrongful death action before the expiration of the statute of limitations.
George, 93 N.M. at 370, 600 P.2d at 822. The district court granted summary judgment to the
attorneys, holding that no attorney-client relationship existed. Id. at 372, 600 P.2d at 824. Although
the attorney-client relationship was the only issue on appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held
not only that issues of material fact existed as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed, but
also as to whether the attorneys' actions were negligent, and as to whether any attorneys' negligence
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's losses. Id. at 376-78, 600 P.2d at 828-30. The important
dictum on the standards regarding duty offered to guide the lower court on remand was based on
the breach of failure to file within the statute of limitation. Id. at 377, 600 P.2d at 829.
45. FirstNational Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 551-52, 698 P.2d at 8-9.
46. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 118, at 189-90 (1977).
47. Id. at 190. Although some of the oldest decisions have suggested that good faith can be a
shield to protect attorneys, an attorney's negligence is based on an objective standard. Id. at 189190. Attorneys will not be liable for a mistaken judgment or a bad result alone. Id. at 189. However,
they will be liable if the mistake or result is attributable to negligence. Id. 204, at 302.
There is much discussion that a good faith standard exception should exist for errors made during
trial. In fact, one court has held that such an exception exists. Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810
S.W.2d (Tenn. 1977). In Stricklan, the trial judge
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, granted the attorney summary judgment in a legal malpractice case, holding that no cause of action
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appropriate standard for evaluating legal malpractice negligence claims
is objective." The FirstNational Bank of Clovis court missed an opportunity to eliminate existing misconceptions regarding the good faith standard's applicability to legal malpractice actions.
B. The Court's Treatment of the Balancing Issue
The First National Bank of Clovis court determined Robinson's malpractice liability and then added the "further compelling reason" that
Robinson should have taken a more conservative approach because the
potential liability clearly outweighed any benefit.49 Because the court
articulated this further reason after it reached the determination of malpractice, the court left confusion as to how this reason fits within the
holding of the case and as to how this important issue should be treated
in future negligent failure to warn cases.
Because the court labels the balancing issue a "further" reason, the
issue can be assumed to be simply another factor that courts should
examine in making malpractice liability determinations. Its significance
may be no more or less than any of the other factors courts should look
to in making malpractice determinations. Under this interpretation, it is
feasible to argue that if the facts of a particular case violate what the
reasonably prudent attorney would do, an attorney may be held liable
even where the burden of potential liability does not clearly outweigh
any benefit to the client.
However, the court specifically added the balancing issue after it had
clearly held Robinson liable for malpractice. This positioning allows the
interpretation that the "further compelling reason" is an alternative holding. Under this interpretation, a court could find an attorney negligent
either if the potential liability clearly outweighed the benefit to the client
existed against attorneys arising out of the manner in which they honestly choose to present their
case to the trier of facts. Id. at 812. The court based its decision on Rondel v. Worsley [19661 1
All E.R. 467, [1966 C.A.] 3 All E.R. 647 and [1967 H.L.], 3 All E.R. 993, which held that as a
matter of law no action would lie against an attorney by his client for negligence in and about his
conduct of the client's case in court. 546 S.W.2d at 813.
The Stricklan decision typifies the developing law on mistakes made during a trial. THOMAS P.
BROWN III, How TO AvoID BEING SUED BY YOUR CLIENTS 13 (1981). Although attorneys are not
automatically immune from liability for mistakes made during a trial, courts favor attorneys where
the mistake involves judgmental decisions on trial tactics during the trial. Id. This is especially true
where it is difficult to ascertain what would have occurred had the attorney not used the particular
tactic being questioned. Id. at 13-14. Compare Haskell, The TrialLawyer's Immunity from Liability

for Errors of Judgment, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF TRIAL LAWYERS: THE MALPRACTICE QUESTION

141 (1979) (advocating that trial lawyers should be immune from malpractice suits based on their
professional judgment during the litigation process), with Beckham, Trial Lawyer's Liability for

Judgmental Decisions, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF TRIAL LAWYERS: THE MALPRACTICE QUESTION

157 (1979) (refuting Haskell).
48. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 118, at 190 (1977).

49. First National Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 553, 698 P.2d at 10.
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or if the other particular circumstances of the case substantiated legal
malpractice. Thus, if the potential liability clearly outweighs the benefit,
a reasonable attorney must warn. This interpretation would force attorneys
to warn of potential adverse consequences even where they have no
reasonable grounds to believe that their advice is questionable." °
The court's treatment of the balancing issue allows for even a further
interpretation of how this issue could be addressed in negligent failure
to warn cases. Under this final interpretation, the balancing issue would
be a threshold consideration where the court would examine the particular
facts and circumstances of the case only if on balance the potential liability
clearly outweighed any benefit. If this is not the case, no liability attaches.
If it is the case, the court would proceed to look at the facts and circumstances of the case to determine if liability will attach.
The court's treatment of the balancing issue leaves open various interpretations of how the balance could be applied in future negligent failure
to warn cases. Because FirstNational Bank of Clovis opens the way for
creative argument, its full impact must await further development in future
cases.
C. The Significance of First National Bank of Clovis in the Developing
Law of Legal Malpractice
The New Mexico Court of Appeals confined its analysis and discussion
to the precise facts of the First National Bank of Clovis case. By so
doing, it missed an opportunity to discuss the significance of this case in
the developing law of legal malpractice.
Beginning in 1979, New Mexico experienced an increase in legal
malpractice actions, 5 ' with three attorneys recently held liable for malpractice. 2 The New Mexico statistics support the contention that malpractice actions against attorneys are becoming significantly more numerous
50. This interpretation directly contradicts the notion the court of appeals quoted from Smith that
an attorney is not obligated to advise clients of every possibility if there is no reasonable ground
for him to believe that his advice is questionable. First National Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 553,
698 P.2d at 10. See supra note 34 for the complete quote.
51. Although New Mexico has experienced only eight reported malpractice cases in its history,
seven of the cases were reported from 1979 to 1985. See Sanders v. Smith, 83 N.M. 706, 496 P.2d
1102 (Ct. App. 1972); Jaramillo v. Hood, 93 N.M. 433, 601 P.2d 66 (1979); George v. Caton, 93
N.M. 370, 600 P.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1979); Rodriguez v. Horton, 95 N.M. 356, 622 P.2d 261 (Ct.
App. 1980); Holland v. Lawless, 95 N.M. 490, 623 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1981); Wisdom v. Neal,
568 F. Supp. 4 (D.N.M. 1982); Shaw v. Warner, 101 N.M. 22, 677 P.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1984); First
National Bank of Clovis v. Diane, Inc., 102 N.M. 548, 698 P.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1985).
52. See First National Bank of Clovis v. Diane, Inc., 102 N.M. 548, 698 P.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1985);
Wisdom v. Neal, 568 F. Supp. 4 (D.N.M. 1982) (where attorney was liable for damages for clients'
losses because of the attorney's improper distribution of an estate); Rodriguez v. Horton, 95 N.M.
361, 622 P.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1980) (where attorney was liable to client for $10,500 compensatory
damages and $25,000 punitive damages for fraud and malpractice in connection with settlement of
client's workmen's compensation case for only $8,000).
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and that attorney malpractice may be the fastest growing area of the law.53
Courts are imposing malpractice liability based on an attorney's failure
to warn with greater frequency. 54 First National Bank of Clovis is an
important example of this trend in malpractice law.
The court of appeals held Robinson liable for malpractice by applying
the objective test of what a reasonable attorney would have done. The
question arises, however, whether specific limitations should be placed
on attorneys' duty to warn. Robinson argued that the duty to warn of
potential liability is analogous to the requirement of informed consent in
the medical field and such consent is not appropriate in the legal profession.55 Requiring attorneys to obtain informed consent from their clients
before pursuing a particular course of action, just as members of the
medical community have been required to obtain patients' informed consent to the use of medical procedures and treatments, would remove
limitations on the attorneys' duty to warn.56
The imposition of informed consent duties on attorneys would have
significant implications. One obvious result would be a substantial increase in attorney exposure to liability for legal malpractice." In addition,
Robinson's argument asserts that "the imposition of such a duty would
hold a lawyer to a preposterous and incredible standard." 58 Attorneys
would be required to accompany any advice rendered with a discussion
53. See Lawter, Recent Developments in Lawyers' Malpractice, 56 OKLA. B.J. 321 (1985).
Reported malpractice decisions during the 1970s almost equalled all previously reported malpractice
cases. Id. See also Peck, A New Tort Liability for Lack of Informed Consent in Legal Matters, 44
LA. L. REV. 1289 (1984). Reasons for this substantial increase include the increased emphasis on
standards of professional care and competence and consumer rights. See Lawter, supra, at 321.
54. Statistics regarding legal malpractice reveal that in 1982, while slightly less than ten percent
of malpractice claims were based on a failure to inform, errors of that type gave rise to the highest
percentage of claims of all categories. Peck, A New Tort Liabilityfor Lack of Informed Consent in
Legal Matters, 44 LA. L. REV. 1289, 1292 (1984).
55. FirstNational Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 552, 698 P.2d at 9. The court of appeals declined
to address Robinson's argument, stating that it was necessary to concentrate on only the particular
facts of the present case, and not address such a broad statement. Id.
56. See Peck, A New Tort Liabilityfor Lack of Informed Consent in Legal Matters, 44 LA. L.
REV. 1289 (1984). Failure to obtain informed consent is a suggested new tort in the legal profession.
Id. See also Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 307 (1980).
Peck states that the theory of informed consent receives support in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Peck, supra, at 1290. The preamble to the Model Rules provides: "As advisor, a lawyer
provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and
explains their practical implications." Id. at 1291.
Rule 1.4(b) states: "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." Id.
The comment to rule 1.4 provides that the "client should have sufficient information to participate
intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which
they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so." Id.
57. Id. at 1289. Peck states that an attorney's liability will be determined not only by legal
profession standards, but also by what the public expects in the way of legal services. Id.
58. First National Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 551, 698 P.2d at 8.
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of all possible consequences, alternatives, and consequences of the alternatives. This extra amount of time spent with clients and research to
59
determine multiple consequences could lead to even higher legal fees.
It might also impair client confidence in attorney judgments if attorneys
are required to justify what they say to clients in order to avoid malpractice
actions. On the other hand, such a duty would lead to more informed
clients and might lessen the complaints generated regarding the legal
6
profession.' The quality of service might improve, and malpractice
62
claims could actually decline due to the efforts to inform.
As discussed earlier, the New Mexico Court of Appeals chose to confine
its holding to the facts of the FirstNationalBank of Clovis case. However,
the decision requires us to speculate whether its holding does help to pave
the way for a new tort of informed consent in the legal profession in New
Mexico.
V. CONCLUSION
Although some areas of ambiguity remain, First National Bank of
Clovis makes it clear that situations exist where attorneys must warn their
clients of potential liability in the event that their advice is later deemed
to be incorrect.63 The test for deciding when warning is appropriate is
whether, given the particular circumstances of the case, a lawyer using
and casuch skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary 6skill
4 Attorneys'
pacity commonly possess and exercise would have warned.
good faith belief that their advice is accurate will not shield them from
liability.65
Because the test is requisite competence under the circumstances, the
only real guideline the court could provide for the future is that when
attorneys are in situations similar to Robinson's, they must warn their
clients of potential liability. However, because First National Bank of
Clovis is consistent with the current trend in legal malpractice law of
59. Peck, supra note 56, at 1306. Peck also suggests that attorneys would be liable for nonnegligent judgment errors about undisclosed risks or potential gains which, if disclosed, would have
caused a client to either litigate or avoid litigation by rejecting or accepting a settlement offer. Id.
at 1299.
60. Id. at 1306-07.
61. Id. at 1307. A New York study indicates that actively participating clients received better
settlements of their personal injury claims, and lawyers received higher contingent fees. Id. at 130607.
62. Id. at 1306. Peck suggests that a patient's understanding of the dangers of a medical procedure
may reduce the frequency of medical malpractice suits and that the same favorable result may occur
in the legal profession. Id.
63. See FirstNational Bank of Clovis, 102 N.M. at 548, 698 P.2d at 5.
64. Id. at 552, 698 P.2d at 9.
65. Id. at 553, 698 P.2d at 10.
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more frequently holding attorneys liable for failure to inform, careful
practitioners may be well-advised to take added precautions to keep their
clients fully informed.
NIKKI J. MANN

